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Insurance 
Bad Faith and 
Punitive Damages 
After Sloan v. 
State Farm 
Introduction 
Recently the New Mexico Supreme Comt claiified when an instrnction on 
punitive damages must be given in an insurance bad faith case. In so doing, the 
court resolved a conflict between the New Mexico Court of Appeals and the 
Tenth Circuit. 1 The case, Sloan v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Association,2 
recognized that proof of "bad faith" in an insurance context ordinarily supplies 
the culpable mental state necessary to sustain an award of punitive damages.1 
The court's analysis is notew01thy for the effort to clarify the standards for both 
first and third patty bad faith. Finally, the court rewrote Un Civil 13-1718 to 
comport with its decision.4 
The Sloan issue arose when the New Mexico Comt of Appeals in Teague­
Strebeck Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler Insurance Co.5 concluded from its reading of 
Paiz v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.6 and Allsup's Convenience Stores, Inc. v. 
North River Insurance Company7 that there was a "real distinction" between the 
"bad faith" sufficient to prove a simple breach of the implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing for an awai·d of compensatory damages and the "bad faith" 
sufficient to sustain an award of punitive damages.8 Therefore, the court of 
appeals concluded, in order to recover punitive dainages the insured must 
demonstrate some culpable mental state in addition to the "bad faith" necessary to 
establish the underlying claim. The comt of appeals also indicated that the 
existing Uniform Jury Instruction on bad faith and punitive damages was not an 
accurate statement of the law and should be reconsidered.9 The Tenth Circuit 
Court of Appeals, however, flatly rejected the Teague-Strebeck analysisw, thus 
creating a conflict between jurisdictions. 
This article analyzes Sloan by examining three interrelated topics. First, Sloan is 
placed in context of the historical development of "bad faith" insurance law in 
New Mexico. Second, the circumstances in which the Sloan issue arose are 
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IN THIS ISSUE: 
5 In the United 
States District 
Court 
by Jane Gagne, J.D. 
7 In the Appellate 
Courts 
9 
by Chris Key, J.D. 
Record On Appeal 
by Kathleen J. Love, J.D. 
1 0 Verdicts & Sett lements 
by Gabrielle Valdez, J.D. 
13 Workers' 
Compensation 
by George Weeth, !,D. 
15 Book Review 
by Lee Hunt, J.D. 
16 News & Notes 
by Allegra Carpenter, J.D. 
1 9 Setting the Record 
Straight 
by Joe Kennedy, J.D. 
22 
New 
Continued from page I 
examined and the Supreme Comt's 
resolution of the issue is discussed. 
Third, Sloan is mined for some 
additional observations that may be 
of benefit for future bad faith cases. 
Insurance Bad Faith 
The New Mexico common law has 
long recognized that there is a 
characteristic of mind that 
accompanies the failure to act in 
good faith that may provide the basis 
for an award of punitive damages.11 
From a conceptual vantage, bad faith 
impmts an element of scienter
because it implies a conscious 
choice, that is a decision not to act in 
good faith. Bad faith, although rarely 
defined, is often conjoined with other 
types of conduct that suggest 
culpable states of mind - fraud,12 
willfulness or malice,11 wrongful and 
intentional, 14 improper purpose, 15 
b. 16 ar 1trary acts, a gross abuse of 
discretion, 17 or treachery . 18 Bad faith 
has also been associated with other 
states of mind that do not include a 
specific intent to haim, but rather fall 
into a lesser category such as gross 
1
. 19 kl 'O neg 1gence , rec ess conduct,-
breach of fiduciary duty.21 There is 
also recognition in the law that bad 
faith may take place on a continuum 
and fall between mere negligence 
and a specific intent to haim.22 The 
common law therefore classifies bad 
faith with other types of wrongful 
conduct that suppo1t an awai·d of 
punitive damages. The long­
standing Unifonn Jmy lnstrnction on 
punitive damages embodies the 
common law.21 
Bad faith has developed a more 
specialized meaning in the insurance 
context, but it remains grounded in 
conduct that demonstrates a state of 
mind beyond that of mere stupidity. 
The descriptor "insurance bad faith" 
is judicial sho1t hand for a claim 
aiising from breach of the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing. There is implied into eve1y 
contract of insurance a covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing." First 
recognized in Lujan v. Gonzales,25 
Mexico Tri a I 
the implied covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing is the basis for the 
insurer's common law duty to treat 
its insured fairly. The breach of the 
insurer's implied promise to act 
fairly is the basis for the "bad faith" 
claim. 
Lawyer 
insurance bad faith case usually 
involves the situation where a third 
paity has brought suit against the 
insured and the insurer either refuses 
to provide a defense asse1ting that 
the claims fall outside of coverage or 
accepts the defense and fails to pay a 
policy limit demand where 
warranted. In either case, 
The concept of impartiality and fair 
balancing of interests remains at the heart 
of New Mexico's law of insurance bad 
faith. 
the insured is hai111ed by 
the risk of exposure to a 
judgment in excess of the 
policy limits, and the third 
paity is affected by the 
expense of litigating a 
claim that should have 
If, as the saying goes, there is a thin 
line between love and hate, there is 
an equally fine line between good 
faith and bad faith. The comt of 
appeals in Lujan recognized the 
difficulty in parsing the concept of 
bad faith and, significantly, chose to 
define "bad faith" in reverse, that is 
by giving fonn and content to what 
constitutes good faith. "What is 
good faith? We do not attempt to 
give a complete definition because of 
the variety of situations held to 
involve a question of good faith."26 
The comt of appeals offered some 
guidance which remains a good 
measure of bad faith and a useful 
analytic starting place. 
We use the term "good faith" in 
this case to mean an insurer cannot 
be paitial to its own interests, but 
must give its interests and the 
interests of its insured equal 
consideration. 
* * *
To fulfill the duty of giving equal 
consideration to the interests of the 
insured and the insurer there must 
be a fair balancing of these 
interests.27 
The concept of impartiality and fair 
balancing of interests remains at the 
heait of New Mexico's law of 
insurance bad faith. 
There ai·e two basic types of 
insurance bad faith cases.28 The first 
type is a direct action between an 
insured and his insurer. This is 
commonly referred to as a "first 
party action."29 The second type of 
been paid. In the ordinai·y case, in 
order for the injured third party to 
assert a claim against the insurer, the 
insured must assign his bad faith 
cause of action against the insurer to 
the third party, which then allows the 
third paity to pursue recove1y for an 
excess judgment against the insurer, 
or the insured may pursue the "third 
party" bad faith claim in exchange 
for an agreement by the third party 
not to execute on the judgment until 
the bad faith action is concluded.10 
This second type of bad faith cause 
is referred to as a "third paity 
action."11 
The distinction between the 
circumstances giving rise t.o a first or 
third paity claim has resulted in 
slightly different tests to detenmne 
bad faith. New Mexico adheres to a 
broad definition of bad faith in first 
party cases, described as a "frivolous 
or unfounded refusal" to pay a 
compensable claim.12 The reason
that a "frivolous and unfounded 
refusal" to pay constitutes bad faith 
is because "unfounded" in this 
context means a "reckless disregai·d" 
or an "utter failure" to exercise cai·e 
for the insured's interests.13 The 
implied covenant protects against the 
insurer's bad faith -- i.e. "wrongful 
and intentional affronts to the other 
paity's rights, or a least affronts 
where the breaching party is 
consciously aware of, and proceeds 
with deliberate disregard for, the 
potential hai111 to the other paity. "14 
Thus, proof of the breach of the 
implied covenant, or "bad faith," 
establishes the kind of conduct that 
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has traditionally been sufficient to 
allow an award of punitive damages. 
In a third party claim, the implied 
covenant of good faith requires that 
an insurer give the interests of its 
insured consideration equal to its 
own when evaluating a settlement 
offer within policy limits." "[G]ood 
faith does impose upon the insurer 
the duty to settle whenever 
practicable."36 Although an insurer's
evaluation of the costs and benefits 
of settlement is general I y accorded 
some deference, that "judicial 
deference lessens whenever there is a 
substantial likelihood of a recovery 
that exceeds policy limits."37 The 
potential for an excess verdict places 
the insurer in an "inherent conflict of 
interest" with its insured and, under 
such circumstances, the insurer 
"should place itself in the shoes of 
the insured and 'conduct itself as 
though it alone were liable for the 
entire amount of the judgment.' "38 
Ultimately it is the insurer's decision 
or not to exercise "honest judgment 
[and] acting on adequate information 
after competent investigation of the 
claim" that determines whether the 
insurer has acted in bad faith.19 The 
failure to exercise honest judgment 
would be dishonest, a circumstance 
that suggests a state of mind that 
would, given the historical 
definitions of bad faith, sustain an 
awar·d of punitive damages. 
This body of law seemed well­
established until the cou1t of appeals' 
decision in Teague-Strebeck Motors 
v. Ou:ysler Insurance Co_.u, In a
sho1t opinion on a motion for
reconsideration, the comt of appeals
dete1mined that there were two tiers
of "bad faith." The comt held that
there was innocent "bad faith" that
allowed for a recovery of
compensatory damages and a second
tier of "bad faith" evidencing a
culpable mental state sufficient to
sustain an awar·d of punitive
damages . .j' The comt of appeals also
indicated that the existing Uniform
Jury Instruction on bad faith and
punitive damages was no longer an
accurate statement of the law and
should be reconsidered . .j" The cou1t
of appeals based its decision on its 
reading of two important bad faith 
decisions by the New Mexico 
Supreme Cowt -- Allsup's 
Convenience Stores. Inc. v. North 
River Insurance Company4'1 and Paiz 
v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co . .j.j 
At least one federal dist1ict cou1t and 
the Tenth Circuit flatly rejected the 
Teague-Strebeck analysis . .j' In the 
City of Hobbs v. Hartford Insurance 
Co. the federal district cou1t closely 
exarnined and rejected the cowt of 
appeals' analysis.JI, concluding 
instead that the existing jury 
instruction on punitive damages in a 
bad faith case·11 retained its vitality . .j'
The Uniform Jury Instruction on the 
bad faith punitive damages UJI Civil 
13-1718 (NMRA 2004) provides in
pe1tinent part that:
If you find that plaintiff should 
recover compensatory damages for 
the bad faith actions of the 
insurance company, then you may 
award punitive damages. 
The directions for use of UJI Civil 
13-1718 require that it be given in
every action in which the jury is also
instructed on the bad faith claim,
because as noted in the Committee
Comment "bad faith supports
punitive damages upon a finding of
entitlement to compensatory
damages.".j')
The Teague-Strebeck court stated 
that the directions for use for UJI 13-
1718 were, after Paiz and Allsup's, 
suspect to the extent that they 
required giving the instruction on 
punitive damages just based on a 
showing of a bad faith insurance 
practice without the addition of some 
extra culpable mental state.50 The 
cou1t of appeals held that "there is a 
real distinction between 'bad faith' 
sufficient to suppo1t an awar·d of 
compensatory damages and 'bad 
faith' meriting exemplar·y damages. 
In approp1iate circumstances 'bad 
faith' may include a culpable mental 
state, but it is not necessa1ily so. "51 
The Tenth Circuit was just as clear· 
2 0 0 5 
that some culpable mental state in 
addition to "bad faith" was not 
necessary to sustain and award of 
punitive damages.52 Basically, the 
Tenth Circuit accepted the district 
cou1t's analysis of New Mexico law, 
which it applied in denying the post­
trial motions. The Tenth Circuit held 
that the directions for use for UJI 13-
1718 remained a coITect statement of 
New Mexico law because the New 
Mexico Supreme Cou1t has never 
held them to be invalid.5
1 
The Tenth
Circuit also found persuasive the fact 
that the supreme cou1t had reissued 
the directions for use in the general 
instruction on punitive damages, UJI 
13- I 827, subsequent to its decision
in Paiz v. State Fann Fire &
Casualty Co., that cross-referenced
13-1718 and therefore, the cou1t
concluded, reaffirmed that 13-1718
was a proper instruction for bad faith
cases. The Tenth Circuit's
affirmation of the district cou1t on
this specific point thus created a
clear conflict between the Tenth
Circuit's and the cou1t of appeals'
reading of New Mexico law.-1.j
The Sloan Issue - Bad Faith Plus 
The Tenth Circuit, recognizing the 
conflict, ce1tified the issue to the 
New Mexico Supreme Cornt when 
the opportunity presented itself in the 
fonn of Sloan v. State Farm Mutual 
Automobile Insurance Co." The 
question ce1tified was: 
ls an instruction for punitive 
damages required in every 
insurance bad faith case in which 
the plaintiff has produced evidence 
suppo1ting compensatory damages 
as suggested by [UJI 13-1718 
NMRA 2003], or is the New 
Mexico Cou1t of Appeals coITect 
that subsequent New Mexico 
Supreme Cornt authority requires a 
culpable mental state beyond bad 
faith for imposition of punitive 
damages in insurance bad faith 
cases? Teague-Strebeck Motors. 
Inc. v. Chrysler Ins. Co., [ 1999 
NMCA I 09, PP76-90, 27 N.M. 
603, 985 P.2d 1183).56 
Sloan was a third pmty "failure to 
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settle" bad faith case with a few 
twists.57 Sloan crossed the centerline
and collided head on with a car 
caiTying Mr. and Mrs. Shelton and 
their two children. Plaintiffs 
offered to settle for all family 
members for $300,000, the apparent 
policy limit. The children's claims 
were settled before tiial. The 
underlying case was ttied to a jury 
and resulted in an excess judgment 
of $395,000.58 The jury awarded
$49,500 to Mr. Shelton and 
$495,000 to Mrs. Shelton. State 
Farm paid the award to Mr. Shelton 
and paid $100,000 toward Mrs. 
Shelton's awai·ds claiming the policy 
contained a $100,000 per person 
limit. 
an insured's claim in good faith) and 
the third party claim or failure-to­
settle cases (those involving breach 
of the insurer's duty to settle a third­
paity claim against the insured in 
good faith). 1160 The comt then
reaffiimed the position that the 
imposition of punitive damages 
requii·es evidence of some "culpable 
mental state." In a depaiture from 
the analysis of the court of appeals in 
Teague-Strebeck, however, the comt 
detennined that "bad faith conduct 
by an insurer typically involves a 
culpable mental state. "61 
Rather than adopt a per se rule, as 
suggested by the Committee 
Comment to Ull Civil 13-1718, the 
comt specifically invested 
the trial comt with "the 
The simple holding was that in the typical 
insurance bad faith case, evidence sufficient to 
sustain the claim for compensatory damages 
ordinarily will at least create a question of fact 
for the jury on the claim of punitive damages. 
discretion to withhold a 
punitive damages 
instruction in those rare 
instances in which the 
plaintiff has failed to 
advance any evidence to 
supp01t an awai·d of 
punitive damages."62 
The bad faith case was tiied to a 
jury. The jmy found that State Fann 
had acted in bad faith and awarded 
damages. The dist1ict court refused 
to instruct the jury on punitive 
damages, however, granting 
defendant a judgment on the issue as 
a matter of law. The plaintiffs 
ai·gued that the New Mexico jmy 
instructions, specifically the 
Committee Comment to 13-1718, 
required an instruction on punitive 
damages when the evidence is 
sufficient to instruct on the bad faith 
failure to settle claim thus squarely 
raising the issue in conflict on 
appeal.59 This was the posture of the
case when the Tenth Circuit ce1tified 
the issue. 
The New Mexico Supreme Comt 
began its analysis by first clarifying 
the distinction between first and third 
paity bad faith cases. The comt 
characte1ized a first paity case as the 
"failure-to-pay case (those aiising 
from a breach of the insurer's duty to 
timely investigate, evaluate, or pay 
Thus, the simple holding 
was that in the typical 
insurance bad faith case, evidence 
sufficient to sustain the claim for 
compensatory damages ordinaiily, 
though not invaiiably, will at least 
create a question of fact for the jury 
on the claim of punitive damages. 
The court based its ruling in pait on 
the following language from 
Allsup's Convenience Stores, Inc. v. 
N01th River Insurance Co.63: "[W]hile
bad faith and unreasonableness are 
not always the same thing, there is a 
ce1tain point, detennined by the jury, 
where unreasonableness becomes 
bad faith and punitive damages may 
be awarded."64 The "complex factual
determinations smrnunding the 
insurer's conduct and c01Tesponding 
motives,1165 will ordinaiily requii·e the
jury to so1t out whether the evidence 
establishes a culpable mental state. 
"As a general proposition, therefore, 
once a plaintiff has made a piima 
facie showing sufficient to submit his 
or her bad faith claim to the jury, the 
detennination whether the insurer's 
bad-faith conduct is deserving of 
punitive dainages is for the jmy to 
decide."66 
What showing is required?67 The 
comt concluded that in a first paity 
failure to pay claim, the failure or 
refusal to pay has to be fiivolous or 
unfounded, which the comt 
detennined was the practical 
equivalent of reckless disregard, a 
mental state traditionally sufficient to , 
awai·d punitive damages.68 For a third
paity failure to settle claiin, the 
plaintiff must establish that the 
failure to pay was the result of a 
"dishonest judgment," which the 
comt defined as "a failure by the 
insurer to hones_tly and fairly balance 
its own interests and the interests of 
the insured. 1169 
Wait a minute. This sounds very 
much like the evidence that is 
required to establish the prima facie 
case for insurance bad faith, to reach 
the threshold for compensatory 
damages. And it is. 
The comt reasoned that fovolous and 
unfounded refusal to pay is the 
equivalent of "reckless disregard for 
the interests of the insured and that a 
dishonest balancing of interests is no 
less reprehensible than reckless 
disregard." "Reckless disregai·d" is a 
culpable mental state that histoiically 
had justified an awai·d of punitive 
damages. Indeed, it was the Sloan 
court's recognition that "bad faith" in 
the insurance context has a 
definitional basis which impo1ts a 
culpable mental state that formed the 
hemt of its analysis. 
This recognition led the comt to 
conclude that whether "the bad faith 
evinced by a paiticulai· defendant 
waiTants punitive damages is 
ordinarily a question for the jury to 
resolve."70 The court therefore 
ovenuled Teague-Stt·ebeck to the 
extent that it would require an 
additional culpable mental state in 
"every insurance bad faith case. "7 1 
The court depaited, however, from 
the Committee Comment to 13-1718 
and what it refened to as the "per se 
Jessen rule,"12 which requii·ed that the 
jury be instructed on punitive 
INSURANCE BAD FAITH AND PUNITIVE DAMAGES AFTER SLOAN V. STATE FARM 
January/teoruary 
Perhaps the most salient feature of the 
decision is the supreme court's discussion 
of the "continuum" on which conduct 
evidencing bad faith may occur. 
unreasonable conduct 
reaches a higher state of 
culpability was found by 
the comt to be inherent in 
the Unifonn Jury 
Instructions77 that set fo1th 
the basic elements of first 
and third paity bad faith 
damages in every case in which the 
compensatory claim for bad faith 
went to the jury. The comt 
specifically held that the district 
cou1t has the discretion to withhold a 
punitive damages instruction "in 
those rare instances in which the 
plaintiff has failed to advance any 
evidence" that would suppo1t an 
award for punitive damages. 
In order to assure that the jury is 
given the proper instruction on 
punitive damages in an insurance 
bad faith context, the comt modified 
UTT Civil 13-1718 to read as follows: 
If you find that plaintiff should 
recover compensatory damages for 
the bad faith actions of the 
insurance company, and you find 
that the conduct of the insurance 
company was in reckless disregard 
for the interests of the plaintiff, or 
was based on a dishonest 
judgment, or was otherwise 
malicious, willful, or wanton, then 
you may award punitive 
71 damages.· 
The Comt fu1ther refined its 
rew1iting of 13-1718 by requiring 
that the instruction include the 
definition of "dishonest judgment" as 
"a failure by the insurer to honestly 
and fairly balance its own interests 
and the interests of the insured. "74 
Following the supreme comt's 
decision, the Tenth Circuit reversed 
and remanded for a new trial.75 
Other Points from Sloan 
Perhaps the most salient feature of 
the decision is the supreme comt's 
discussion of the "continuum" on 
which conduct evidencing bad faith 
may occur.76 This concept that 
unreasonable conduct occurs along a 
continuum and that there is some 
point at which negligent or 
cases and to have been aiticulated in 
the Allsup's case.7x The cou1t 
concluded that because the degree of 
unreasonableness will ordinai·ily be a 
question of fact, the usual bad faith 
case will require that the question of 
punitive damages be submitted to the 
jury where the plaintiff has made out 
a prima facie case for compensatory 
dainages.79 
The comt, while acknowledging that 
New Mexico has thus far refused to 
find a cause of action for the 
negligent failure to settle, 
neve1theless determined that 
evidence of negligence or 
unreasonable conduct "provides one 
possible means of demonstrating that 
an insurer has acted in bad faith."'" 
Significantly, the cou1t recognized 
that the touchstone for a bad faith 
failure to settle cause of action is the 
insurer's failure to exercise an honest 
judgment in treating the interests of 
its insured equal to its own.'1 The
cou1t found that there may be 
circumstances in which an insurer 
has in fact conducted a competent 
and timely investigation of a claim, 
but neve1theless has failed to 
exercise an honest judgment and 
thereby become liable for both 
compensatory and punitive 
damages."� The comt approp1iately 
noted that in those circumstances the 
insurer's conduct may be fairly 
regarded as more reprehensible than 
in the case where the investigation of 
the claim was simply incompetent.'1 
What, then, is the imp01t of the 
comt's discussion of a continuum of 
reasonable or unreasonable conduct? 
First, as noted above, the question is 
a factual one requiring submission of 
punitive damages instructions to the 
jury in all but the unusual case.84 
Second, unreasonable conduct in the 
investigation and evaluation of a 
z u u � 25 
claim may very well establish a 
primafacie case of bad faith failure 
to settle, paiticulai·ly when the 
unreasonable conduct demonstrates a 
failure on the pa1t of the insurer to 
give equal consideration to the 
interest of the insured. Third, Sloan 
opens the door for a reconsideration 
of the comt's holding in Ambassador 
Insurance Co. v. St. Paul Fire & 
Marine that the negligent failure to 
settle is not a cause of action in and 
of itself.'' 
' Compare Teague-Strebeck Motors Inc. v. Chrysler Insurance Co., 
1999-NMCA-109, 127 N.M. 603,985 P.2d 1183 and City of Hobbs 
v Nutmeg Insurance Company. 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 31144 (10th 
Cir. 2000). 
'2004-NMSC-4, 85 P3d 230, �N M� 
'kL at TI 6, 85 P3d at 233-34. 
' The Civil Jury Instruction Committee has just published for 
comment the Supreme Court's directed revisions to 13-1718. See 
43 S.B.B. at 24-25 (November 18, 2004). More significant than the 
instruction itself which merely recites the Supreme Court's revision, 
is the committee comment that Jessen v National Excess 
Insurance Co. 108 N.M. 625, 776 P.2d 1244 (1989), found that the 
"the duty of good faith dealing by the parties to an insurance 
contract is a non-delegable duty, breach of which suppcrt vicarious 
liability for punitive damages." The comment is cryptic at best, but 
suggest that the implied covenant's obligations are duty based and 
therefore sound in tort. There continues to be a question whether 
in New Mexico the action for insurance bad faith is contract or tort 
based. It is arguably a hybrid, but that discussion is reserved for 
another day. 
'199S-NMCA-109, 127 N.M. 603,985 P.2d 1183. 
0 118 N.M. 203,880 P.2d 300 (1994). 
'199S-NMSC-6, 127 N.M. 1,976 P.2d 1. 
'Teague-Strebeck Motors, 199S-NMCA-109, TI 85, 127 N.M. at 
624, 985 P.2d at 1202. 
'kiatTI82 n.1, 127 N.M. at 623,985 P.2d at 1201. 
'0 See City of Hobbs v. Nutmeg Insurance Company, 2000 U.S. 
App. Lexis 31144 (10th Cir. 2000). 
·, Cunningham v. Sugar 9 N.M. 105. 49 P .  910 (N.M. Terr. 1897). 
The court in Cunningham v. Sugar recognized as much when it 
held that where the only evidence was that the defendant had 
acted in good faith, there was no basis to instruct on exemplary 
damages. In Cunningham it was clear that the court considered 
"bad faith" to be on a par with malicious or intentionally abusive 
conduct. 9 N.M. at 112-13, 49 P. at 917-18. 
"Madrid v. Rodriguez 2003-NMSC-6, TI 7, 133 N.M. 553,557.66 
P3d 326, 330; Martinez V. Hanns, 102 N.M. 2, 4, 690 P.2d 445,447 
(1984); Chavez v. Sandia Corporation, 89 N.M. 578. 555 P.2d 699 
(1976); State ex rel. State Park & Recreation Commission v. New 
Mexico State Authority, 76 N.M. 1, 27 411 P.2d 984, 1002 (1966); 
Quintana v. Montoya. 64 N.M. 464,469,330 P.2d 549,552 (1958); 
Griego v New York Life Insurance Co. 44 N.M. 330. 341, 102 P.2d 
31, 37 (1940). 
"Torres v El Paso Electric Co , 1999-NMSC-029, TI 53, 127 N.M. 
729,749,987 P .2d 386,406; State ex rel. Taylor v. Johnson, 1998-
NMSC-015, TI 61, 125 N.M. 343,356,961 P.2d 768, 781; Burge v. 
Mid-Continent Casualty Co. 1997-NMSC-009, TI 20, 123 N.M. 1, 7, 
933 P.2d 210, 217; Paiz v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co .. 118 
N.M. 203,210,880 P.2d 300, 307 (1994); Nuclear Corporation v. 
Allendale, 103 N.M. 480,485, 709 P.2d 649,654 (1985) ("To 
assess punitive damages for breach of an insurance pclicy there 
must be evidence of bad faith or malice in the insurer's refusal to 
pay the claim."); Gallegos v Citizens Insurance Agency. 108 N.M. 
722,731,779 P.2d 99, 108 (1989); El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. 
Kysar Insurance Agency, 98 N.M 86, 88, 645 P.2d 442, 444 
(1982); Chacon v. Mountain States Mutual Casualty Co., 82 N.M. 
54,475 P.2d 320 (1970); Vigil v. Rice, 74 N.M. 693, 699, 397 P.2d 
719, 723 (1964); Hagerman v. Cowles 14 N.M. 422, 94 P 946 
(1908). ., Jaynes v. Strong-Thome Mortuary. 1998-NMSC-004, TI 13, 124 
N.M. 613,617,954 P.2d 45, 49; Continental Potash v. Freeport­
McMoran Inc. 115 N.M 690,706,858 P.2d 66, 82 (1993) (''The 
breach of this covenant requires a showing of bad faith or that one 
party wrongfully and intentionally used the contract to the detriment 
of the other party."); Watson Truck & Supply Co. v. Males, 111 N.M. 
57, 61,801 P.2d 639,643 (1990) ("Absent any honest pursuit of 
interests to which a party to a contract is entitled. i.e .. absent cause 
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New 
or excuse, his or her intentional use of the contract to the detriment 
of another party is wrongful, constitutes bad faith, and clearly is a 
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing."). 
"Schein v. Northern Rio Aniba Electric Cooperative Inc., 1997-
NMSC--011, � 11,122 N.M. 800,803,932 P.2d 490,493. 
"Zamora v. Village of Ruidoso Downs 120 N.M. 778,784,907 
P.2d 182, 188 (1995) ("'[A]rbitrary' is synonymous with bad faith or 
failure to exercise honest judgment and an arbitrary act is one 
performed without an adequate determination of principle."); Jones 
v. International Union of Operating Engineers, 72 N.M. 322, 324, 
383 P.2d 571,572 (1963). 
" State Highway Commission v. Ruidoso Telephone Co., 73 N.M. 
487,500, 389 P.2d 606, 615 (1964). 
"Prior v. Rio Grande Irrigation & Colonization Co., 10 N.M. 711, 65 
P. 171 (1901). 
" Aktiengesellschaft Der Harlander Buamwollspinnerie und Zwim­
Fabrik v. Lawrence Walker Cotton Co., 60 N.M. 154,158,288 P.2d
691, 693 (1955); Odell v. Colmar Irrigation & Land Co., 34 N.M.
277,283,280 P. 298,400 (1924) ("There must be fraud, or such 
gross mistakes which necessarily imply bad faith . . .  The mistakes 
must be so gross as to clearly indicate that such engineer has 
acted consciously unjust in the discharge of the duties imposed 
upon him, and has thereby violated the rights of the complaining 
party."). But see First National Bank v. Stover, 21 N.M. 453,476, 
155 P. 905, 913 (1916) (Gross negligence alone is not sufficient to 
demonstrate bad faith. ''There must be actual knowiedge or bad 
faith. Bad faith may be shown by a willful disregard of and refusal 
to learn the facts when available and at hand."). 
"Paiz v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. 118 N.M. 203,210,880 
P.2d 300,307 (1994) ("[A]n award of punitive damages in a 
breach-of-contract case must be predicated on a showing of bad 
faith, or at least a showing the breaching party acted with reckless 
disregard for the interests of the non-breaching party."); Green Tree 
Acceptance Inc. v. Layton 108 N.M. 171, 175, 769 P.2d 84, 88 
(1989) (for purposes of punitive damages the record demonstrated 
"at least recklessness and bad faith, if not of willful, wanton and 
malicious wrongdoing."). 
"Flanagan v. Benvie, 58 N.M. 525,532,273 P.2d 381,385 (1954); 
Roswell State Bank v. Lawrence Walker Cotton Co. 56 N.M. 107, 
112,240 P.2d 1143, 1146 (1952). 
� Roswell State Bank v. Lawrence Walker Cotton Co., 56 N.M. at 
116,240 P.2d at 1148 ("At what point does negligence cease and 
bad faith begin? The distinction between them is that bad faith, or 
dishonesty, is, unlike negligence, willful. The mere failure to make 
inquiry, even though there be suspicious circumstances, does not 
constitute bad faith (Union Bank & Trust Co. v. Girard Trust Co., 
307 Pa. 488,500,501, 161 A 865), unless such failure is due to 
the deliberate desire lo evade knowiedge because of a belief or 
fear that inquiry would disclose a vice or defect in the transaction -
that is to say, where there is an intentional closing of the eyes or 
stopping of the ears."). 
n See UJI Civil 13-1827 ("If you find the conduct of 
____ was [malicious], [willful], [reckless], [wanton], 
[fraudulent] [or] in [bad faith], then you may award punitive 
damages .. ."). 
'' Paiz v. Stale Farm Fire & Casualty Co. 118 N.M. 203, 212, 880 
P.2d 300,309 (1994);Allsup's Convenience Stores Inc. v. North 
River Insurance Co , 1999-NMSC-6, � 33, 127 N.M. 1, 13, 976 
P.2d 1, 13; Ambassador Insurance Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine, 
102 N.M. 28, 30,690 P.2d 1022, 1024 (1984). 
"84 N.M. 229,501 P.2d 673 (Ct. App. 1972). The !J!@1 court 
explicitly tied the recognition of the implied covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing to the insurer's liability for "bad faith." Id. at 236, 
501 P.2d al 681 ("In considering Allstate's liability for bad faith, we 
need not decide whether an insurer's duty to proceed in good faith 
with its insured is an implied covenant in the insurance contract or a 
tort . . .  We do hold that such a duty exists ... Also, the duty of good 
faith is a concept separate from negligence . . .  and ii is a concept 
separate from fraud."). 
� Lujan v. Gonzales, 84 N.M. at 236, 501 P.2d at 680. 
n kl 
• A general description of these two types of bad faith actions is as 
follows; "A third party insurance case involves a contention the 
insurer failed lo settle a third party's claim against the insured within 
policy limits. A first party case, on the other hand, involves a 
contention the insurer failed to pay benefits directly to the insured." 
McCormick v. Sentinel Life Ins. Co , 153 Cal. App. 3d 1030, 1041 
n.7, as modified, 155 Cal. App. 3d 493 (1984). 
n � e.g., O'Neel v. USAA Insurance Company. 2002-NMCA-28, 
131 N.M. 630, 41 P.3d 356; Allsup's Convenience Stores v. North 
River Insurance Co., 1999-NMSC-6, 127 N.M. 1,976 P.2d 1;
Teague-Strebeck Motors Inc. v. Chrysler Insurance Co., 1999-
NMCA-109, 127 N.M. 603,985 P.2d 1183; Paiz v. State Farm Fire 
& Casualty Co , 118 N.M. 203,212,880 P.2d 300,309 (1994). 
• In general, the third party does !)Q! have a direct action against 
the insurer for its bad faith failure lo settle or the refusal to defend. 
The third party may have a claim for violation of the Trade Practices 
and Fraud Section of the Insurance Code, NMSA Section 59A-16-
20. See Hovel v. Allstale Insurance Co. 2004-NMSC-10, 
Mexico Tri a I Lawyer 
_N.M.� 89 P.3d 69; see also D.J. Berardinelli, Hovel v. 
Allstate: A Long Time Coming - The New "Rules of the Road" for 
Uability Insurers, 34 The New Mexico Trial lawyers 57 (2004). 
"See, e.g., Dai/Viand v. Herman, 1998-NMSC-5, 124 N.M. 624, 
954 P.2d 56; Rummel v. Lexington Insurance Co., 1997-NMSC-41, 
123 N.M. 752 (excess carrier's failure lo settle with insured's claim 
assigned to the victim); Ruiz v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co , 36 
F.Supp.2d 1308 (D.N.M. 1999) (applying New Mexico law); Qjy_Qf 
Hobbs v. Hartford Fire Insurance Company. 162 F.3d 576 (10th Cir. 
1998) (essentially a third party failure to settle claim, though brought 
by the insured). 
� Chavez v. Chenoweth, 89 N.M. 423, 429, 553 P.2d 703 (Ct. App. 
1976); Jessen v . National Excess Insurance Company 108 N.M. 
625, 627 n.2, 776 P.2d 1244, 1246 n. 2 (1989). 
• Jackson National Life Insurance Co. v. Receconi 113 N.M. 403,
419,827 P.2d 118, 134 (1992). 
"Paiz v. Slate Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 118 N.M. at 212-213, 880 
P.2d at 309-310. 
• Dairyland Insurance Co. v. Herman, 1998-NMSC-5, �12, 124 
N.M. al 628-29, 954 P.2d at 60-61; see also Lujan v. Gonzales, 84
N.M. 229, 236, 501 P.2d 673 (Ct. App. 1972). 
• kt at� 13, 124 N.M. at 629, 954 P.2d al 61. 
"kt at� 14, 124 N.M. at 629, 954 P.2d al 61. 
� kt quoting Johansen v. California Stale Automobile Ass'n, 538 
P .2d 744, 748 (Cal. 1975). 
• Ambassador Insurance Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance 
Co , 102 N.M. at 32-33, 690 P.2d at 1026-27. 
"1999-NMCA-109, 127 N.M. 603,985 P.2d 1183. 
"kt at� 85, 127 N.M. at 624, 985 P.2d at 1204. 
"kt at� 82 n.1, 127 N.M. al 623 n.1, 985 P.2d al 1203 n.1. 
"1999-NMSC-6, 127 N.M. 1,976 P.2d 1 
� 18 N.M. 203,880 P.2d 300 (1994). 
"See City of Hobbs v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co., Slip Op. No. 
CIV 95-0079 PKILFG (D.N.M. September 10, 1999). 
" Both Paiz and Allsup's were complex decisions, detailed analysis 
of which is beyond the scope of this article. Suffice it to say that 
there is language in each decision that could fairly be read lo 
require evidence of a culpable state of mind beyond that necessary 
to prove bad faith in order to sustain an award of punitive damages. 
The following language from Paiz provides the strongest signal on
this point "As something of an exception to this line of authority, we 
previously have held that an insurance carrier is liable for punitive 
damages ff ii fails to exercise even slight care in discharging its 
contractual obligations to its insured. In holding that the insurers 
utter failure to exercise care for the interests of its insured would 
support submission of the issue of punitive damages for gross 
negligence, we noted in Jessen v. National Excess Insurance Co., 
108 N.M. 625, 776 P.2d 1244 (1989), that 'punitive damages were 
sought exclusively for reckless or grossly negligent conduct.' Id. at 
627, 776 P.2d at 1246 (emphasis added). See UJI Civil 13-1827 
(adopting and defining ·gross negligence' as one basis for awarding 
punitive damages). In Romero v. Me1VVn's, 109 N.M. 249, 255 n.3, 
784 P.2d 992, 998 n.3 (1989), we distinguished our policy regarding 
punitive damages in contract cases, generally, from our policy 
regarding punitive damages for breach of insurance contracts, 
specifically. However, to reaffirm that this Court has not lost sight of 
the limited purpose of punitive damages-to punish and deter 
persons from conduct manifesting a ·culpable mental slate'-we 
now disavow the proposition that in a contract case, including one 
involving an insurance contract, punitive damages may be 
predicated solely on gross negligence. In addition lo, or in lieu of, 
such negligence there must be evidence of an ·evil motive' or a 
·culpable mental slate."' Paiz v.Slate Farm Fire & Casualty Co. 118 
N.M. al 210-11, 880 P.2d al 307-308. This language alone and 
when read in isolation from the history of how the Supreme court 
had interpreted "bad faith" would certainly provide a reasonable 
basis for the court of appeal's conclusion in Teague-Strebeck. 
"UJI Civil 13-1718 (NMRA 2004). 
� City of Hobbs v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co., No. CIV 95-0079 
PKILFG Slip Op. at 10-15. 
'' UJI Civil 13-1718 (NMRA 2004), Committee Comment. 
� Teague-Strebeck, 1999-NMSC-109, �82 n.1, 127 N.M. at 623 
n.1, 985 P.2d at 1203 n.1. 
"kt at� 85, 127 N.M. at 624, 985 P.2d at 1204. 
"City of Hobbs v. Nutmeg Insurance Co., 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 
31144 al '16 ("Nutmeg argues that the evidence is insufficient lo 
support an award for punitive damages under a standard requiring 
something more than bad faith. Because we have held that the jury 
was properly instructed that it could award punitive damages once 
it determined that Nutmeg acted in bad faith, and Nutmeg does not 
challenge the jury's finding of bad faith, we need not address the 
sufficiency of the evidence supporting the punitive damages 
award."). 
" The supreme court had denied a petition for writ of certiorari in 
Teague-Strebeck. See 127 N.M. 391,981 P.2d 1209. 
"See City of Hobbs v. Nutmeg Insurance Company, 2000 U.S 
App. LEXIS 31144 (10th Cir. 2000). 
• 320 F.3d 1073 (10th Cir. 2003). The plaintiffs in Sloan were 
represented by NMTLA stalwarts Lisa Vigil and Steve Vogel. Steve 
Tucker handled the appeal. 
,. Sloan v. Slate Farm Mutual Insurance Co. 2004-NMSC-004, � 1, 
85 P.3d 230. 
"The twist was that Stale Farm had produced two different policies 
to the Sheltons. The first was 100/300 but included language that 
had been the subject of several judicial constructions finding an 
ambiguity and thereby making $300,000 available per person. The 
second policy produced by Slate Farm was 100/300, but without 
the ambiguous language. State Farm claimed the first certified 
policy it had provided to plaintiffs was a mistake. This feature 
certainly may have contributed lo the plaintiffs' unwillingness to 
settle and therefore was evidence of the insurer's culpability in its 
failure to settle. Consider also that the misrepresentation of 
coverage, if the jury accepted that theory, was made to the 
Sheltons, the third parties. Under Hovel v. Allstate Insurance Co .. 
2004-NMSC-10, _N.M.� 89 P.3d 69, there would be a 
potential third party claim for violation of the Trade Practices and 
Fraud Section of the insurance code - "misrepresenting to insureds 
pertinent facts or policy provisions relating lo coverages at issue.'' 
NMSA § 59A-16-20(A). 
,. Sloan v. Slate Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 360 F.3d 
1220, 1222 (10th Cir. 2004). 
"The best factual recitation of the case is found in the Tenth 
Circuit's decision following the New Mexico Supreme Court's 
decision on the certified question. See Sloan v. Stale Farm Mutual 
Automobile Insurance Co., 360 F.3d 1220 (10th Cir. 2004). 
00 Sloan v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 2004-NMSC-004, � 2, 
_N.M. at� 85 P .3d at 232. 
" kt al� 6, _N.M. at _, 85 P.3d at 233-34. 
"kt 
"1999-NMSC-6, � 45, 127 N.M. at 16, 976 P.2d at 16. 
� The supreme court had made a similar obseNation some 46 
years before noting rhetorically "[a]t what point does negligence 
cease and bad faith begin?" Roswell State Bank v. Lawrence 
Walker Cotton Co. 56 N.M. at 116, 240 P.2d at 1148. See note22, 
supra. 
� Sloan v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. 2004-NMSC-004, � 16, 
_N.M. at� 85 P.3d at 236. 
"kt 
� In a very helpful discussion the supreme court examined the 
difference between first and third party bad faith cases. This 
discussion is particularly useful because historically New Mexico 
appellate courts have been somewhat lax in their recognition of this 
important distinction and have repeatedly blurred the lines between 
these two distinct species of bad faith. 
"� 2004-NMSC-004, � 18, _N.M. at� 85 P.3d at 236-
37. 
"� 2004-NMSC-004, � 20,_N.M at� 85 P.3d at 237. 
� Sloan, 2004-NMSC-004, � 6�N.M. at� 85 P.3d at 234. 
"kt 
nThe reference is to Jessen v. National Excess Insurance Co., 108 
N.M. 625,627, 776 P.2d 1244, 1246 (1989), a significant first party 
bad faith case. Jessen held that "[b]ad faith supports punitive 
damages upon a finding of entitlement to compensatory damages." 
Jessen v. National Excess Insurance Co., 108 N.M. at 627, 776 
P.2d at 1246. Jessen rested on United Nuclear Corporation v. 
Allendale Mutual Insurance Co., 103 N.M. 480, 709 P.2d 649 
(1985), in which the Supreme Court held that "[t]o assess punitive 
damages for breach of an insurance policy there must be evidence 
of bad faith or malice in the insurer's refusal to pay the claim.'' Id. at 
485, 709 P.2d at 654. The court then noted that "'[b]ad faith' has 
been defined as meaning · any frivolous or unfounded refusal to 
pay." Quoting State Farm General Insurance Co. v. Clifton, 86 N.M. 
757,759,527 P.2d 798,800 (1974). Taken at face value the 
discussion in Allendale would appear to confirm that evidence of a 
prima facie case for first party bad faith is sufficient to get to the jury 
on punitive damages. 
n Sloan, 2004-NMSC--004, 23, _N.M. at� 85 P.3d at 238. 
"kt 
" Sloan v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 360 F.3d 
1220 (10th Cir. 2004). 
"Sloan, 2004-NMSC--004, ffl] 16, 17, _N.M. at _, 85 P.3d at 
236. 
"See UJI 13-1702, 13-1704. � 2004-NMSC--004,  17, 
_N.M. at� 85 P.3d at 236. 
• Sloan, 2004-NMSC--004, � 16, _N.M. at _, 85 P.3d at 236. 
"kt 
., Sloan, 2004-NMSC--004, � 20, _N.M. al� 85 P.3d at 237. 
" Sloan, 2004-NMSC--004,, 22, _N.M. at� 85 P .3d at 238. 
"kt 
"kt
� Sloan, 2004-NMSC--004, ffll 23, _N.M. at� 85 P.3d at 238 
(" As a result of the foregoing analysis, we conclude that in most 
cases, the plaintiffs theory of bad faith, if proven, will logically also 
support punitive damages."). 
M 102 N.M. 28, 30,690 P.2d 1022, 1024 (1984). 
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